ᠮᠣᠩᠭᠤᠯ ᠬᠠᠭᠠᠨᠲᠤ ᠤᠯᠤᠰ ᠶᠠᠫᠣᠨ ᠢ ᠳᠠᠶᠢᠯᠠᠭᠰᠠᠨ ᠨᠢ （1274᠂ 1281 ᠣᠨ） .pdf

THE MONGOL INVASIONS OF JAPAN 1274 AND 1281 STEPHENTURNBULL ILLUSTRATED BY RICHARD HOOK CAMPAIGN •217 THE MONGOL INVASIONS OF JAPAN 1274 AND 1281 STEPHENTURNBULL ILLUSTRATED BY RICHARD HOOK Series editors Marcus Cowper and Nikolai Bogdanovic Firstpublishedin2010byOspreyPublishing MidlandHouse,WestWay,Botley,OxfordOX20PH,UK 44-0223rdSt,Suite219,LongIslandCity,NY11101,USA E-mail:info@ospreypublishing.com ©2010OspreyPublishingLimited Allrightsreserved.Apartfromanyfairdealingforthepurposeofprivate study,research,criticismorreview,aspermittedundertheCopyright, DesignsandPatentsAct,1988,nopartofthispublicationmaybe reproduced,storedinaretrievalsystem,ortransmittedinanyform orbyanymeans,electronic,electrical,chemical,mechanical,optical, photocopying,recordingorotherwise,withoutthepriorwrittenpermission ofthecopyrightowner.EnquiriesshouldbeaddressedtothePublishers. ISBN:9781846034565 E-bookISBN:9781849082501 EditorialbyIliosPublishingLtd,Oxford,UK(www.iliospublishing.com) PagelayoutbyTheBlackSpot IndexbyMargaretVaudrey TypesetinMyriadProandSabon MapsbyBounford.com 3Dbird’s-eyeviewsbyTheBlackSpot BattlesceneillustrationsbyRichardHook OriginatedbyPPSGrasmereLtd PrintedinChinathroughWorldprintLtd. 1011121314 10987654321 DEDICATION TomygrandsonDanielRichardRobinson,born24February2009. EDITOR’S NOTE Unlessotherwiseindicated,allimagesinthisbookaretheproperty oftheauthor. AUTHOR’S NOTE Theaccountwhichfollowsoftheinvasionsof1274and1281isdrawnfrom sourcesthatarehistorical,literaryandarchaeological.Ithasalsoinvolved agreatdealofpersonaltravelandfieldwork.In2005Iretracedthecourse oftheMongolinvasionsfromKoreaviatheislandsofTsushimaandIki tothesiteofthefirstlandfallinHakataBayinFukuokaprefecture,and in2008IvisitedforthefirsttimetheislandofTakashima,theplacewhere thekamikazestruckwithitsgreatestintensity.ThereIhadtheprivilegeof beingshownitemsundergoingconservationthathadbeenpainstakingly retrievedfromtheunderseawrecksoftheMongolfleet.ForthisIthank RandallSasakiandhisteam,whosepioneeringworkinunderwater archaeologyhasaddedsomuchtoourknowledgeoftheMongol invasions.IalsothankChrisBarnesoftheBritishLibrary,theJapanese GalleryinIslington,thestaffoftheNationalMilitaryMuseuminBeijing,the NationalMuseumofJapaneseHistoryatSakura,KyushuNationalMuseum, theHakozakiShrineandtheMuseumoftheMongolInvasionsinHakatafor theirkindcooperation. ARTIST’S NOTE Readersmaycaretonotethattheoriginalpaintingsfromwhichthe colourplatesinthisbookwerepreparedareavailableforprivatesale. ThePublishersretainallreproductioncopyrightwhatsoever. Allenquiriesshouldbeaddressedto: ScorpioGallery,POBox475,Hailsham,EastSussexBN272SL,UK ThePublishersregretthattheycanenterintonocorrespondenceupon thismatter. THE WOODLAND TRUST OspreyPublishingaresupportingtheWoodlandTrust,theUK’sleading woodlandconservationcharity,byfundingthededicationoftrees. Artillery CavalryInfantry Key to military symbols Company/Battery Army Division Brigade Regiment BattalionCorpsArmy Group Key to unit identification Commander Parent unit Unit identifier (+) with added elements (–) less elements FORACATALOGUEOFALLBOOKSPUBLISHEDBYOSPREYMILITARY ANDAVIATIONPLEASECONTACT: OspreyDirect,c/oRandomHouseDistributionCenter, 400HahnRoad,Westminster,MD21157 Email:uscustomerservice@ospreypublishing.com OspreyDirect,TheBookServiceLtd,DistributionCentre, ColchesterRoad,FratingGreen,Colchester,Essex,CO77DW E-mail:customerservice@ospreypublishing.com www.ospreypublishing.com CONTENTS INTRODUCTION 5 Japan and the Mongol Empire The Mongol conquest of China The land of gold Threats and preparation CHRONOLOGY 17 OPPOSING COMMANDERS 19 Khubilai Khan and the Mongol leaders Hojo Tokimune The shugo and the jito OPPOSING ARMIES 24 Sources for the invasion Tactical differences Samurai arms and armour Mongol arms and armour THE FIRST MONGOL INVASION OF JAPAN, 1274 32 Opposing plans Orders of battle The invasion of Tsushima The invasion of Iki Landfall at Hakata BETWEEN THE INVASIONS, 1275–81 51 THE SECOND MONGOL INVASION OF JAPAN, 1281 55 Opposing plans Orders of battle The Eastern Route Army The battle of Hakata Bay The battle of Takashima The kamikaze AFTERMATH 80 Rewards, religion and retribution Japan’s revenge The fall of Kamakura The myth of the Mongol invasions THE BATTLEFIELDS TODAY 91 FURTHER READING 94 GLOSSARY 94 INDEX 95 5 LEFT TheMongolinvadersattack IkiIslandin1274.Herewesee TairaKagetaka,theheroofthe defenceofIki,surroundedby Mongolsoldiersarmedwith straightspears.(Genko Shiryokan,Fukuoka) The vast Mongol Empire, established during the early part of the 13th century by Genghis Khan and then enlarged and consolidated by his descendants, is one of the greatest success stories in world military history. This book, however, is concerned with one of its few failures. Impressive though the Mongol conquests may have been when they were carried out from horseback across the sweeping land mass of Central Asia, these achievements were to be challenged robustly on the fringes of their great empire, and among these military reverses no expedition was to be so dramatically curtailed as the attempts by Genghis Khan’s grandson Khubilai Khan to conquer Japan. After an initial invasion in 1274 (which may have been intended solely as a brief reconnaissance in force), two massive Mongol armadas united for a serious attempt at conquest in 1281. Prevented from landing by the bravery of the samurai – the knights of Japan – the invaders became sitting targets for a devastating typhoon that destroyed their ambitions as thoroughly as it destroyed their ships. So decisive was this intervention that the belief grew that the storm had been sent by the kami (gods) of Japan as an answer to prayer. It was therefore dubbed the kamikaze – the ‘divine wind’. In the centuries that followed the myth of the kamikaze grew to dominate the narrative of the Mongol invasions of Japan. The result was that the exploits of the human warriors whose actions had made its effects possible became overshadowed both by the knockout blow that the storm had provided and by an anachronistic belief that the samurai were displaying an unselfish and nationalistic consciousness in the face of a foreign enemy. This myth was to reach a climax during the final months of World War II, when the Japanese, faced with an invasion of their homeland by a foreign enemy for the first time since the Mongol invasions, turned in desperation to suicide attacks and adopted the name of ‘kamikaze’ for the pilots who were to carry them out. JAPAN AND THE MONGOL EMPIRE During the 13th century the main driving force in East Asia was provided by the nomadic tribes of the north who became united under the leadership of Genghis Khan, and over a period of half a century the Mongol Empire redrew the map of the Asiatic continent. It was, however, a process from which the island nation of Japan managed to stay aloof for more than 70 years, maintaining no official diplomatic relations with either China or Korea at this time. Japan may have had close economic and cultural ties with both INTRODUCTION countries through international trade, but her political stance was one of splendid isolation until the ruler of the Mongol Empire decided that this strategically located little country should either be persuaded or forced to enter international politics. This move was instigated by Khubilai Khan (1215–94), who became the first emperor of the Yuan (Mongol) dynasty of China in 1271, an achievement that symbolized dramatically the transformation of the Mongols from their origins as nomadic dwellers in felt tents to the sedentary rulers of a civilized state. Thus it was that when, only three years later, Khubilai Khan first attempted to extend his hegemony to Japan, the military campaign he carried out was launched not from the grassy steppes of Central Asia but from the harbours and estuaries of southern Korea. The Mongol invasions of Japan, although masterminded by the heirs of an extensive land-based military power of which the Japanese knew very little and of whose military tactics the samurai had no prior experience, therefore brought into face-to-face conflict certain military forces that were uncomfortably familiar with each other. The expeditions of 1274 and 1281 may therefore be seen as one further stage in the history of the relations between Japan, Korea and China. For centuries that relationship had swung between peace and war, and the Mongol invasion of Japan in 1274 was far from being the first seaborne raid to have been launched across the Straits of Tsushima, the area of sea that divides Japan from the nearest point on the Asiatic land mass. The difference was that most of the previous raids had been carried out in the opposite direction. This was the phenomenon of the wako, the Japanese pirates, whose depredations had flung into reverse a long-standing admiration for the Japanese that had been felt across East Asia, and for which the Mongol invasions could even be seen as revenge. It had all once been so very different. When Buddhism arrived in Japan from China around the year 552 it came gift-wrapped in Chinese culture, and the enthusiasm exhibited over the following centuries by successive Japanese emperors went far beyond any interest in or commitment to a new religion. The glorious Tang dynasty in particular was to provide the inspiration for creating an ordered and well-governed Japan that would be a reflection of the Chinese and Buddhist world order, and no better symbol of this attitude was to be provided than the establishment of Japan’s first permanent capital city in 710 at Nara, a place laid out as a miniature version of the Tang capital of Chang’an. During the time of the Sui dynasty who had preceded the Tang, their first envoy to Japan had surmised that the people he met there were the descendants of ancient Chinese who had gone abroad in search of the islands of the immortals, a warm sentiment echoed in the official history of the Sui dynasty where the Japanese are described as ‘rather quiet… They seldom engage in banditry… By nature they are honest. They have a refined manner.’ It was a positive impression that was to be reinforced by the steady stream of Buddhist monks, students and ambassadors who made their way to the Tang court from Japan. Indeed, the personal bearing of the envoy Fujiwara Kiyokawa in front of the Emperor of China convinced his host that Japan was ‘a country of etiquette and gentlemen’, an expression to be repeated time and again. Yet by 1266 that perception had changed. As his grip on China became more secure, Khubilai Khan sent two envoys to Japan with the message that the two countries should ‘establish friendly relations’. The implications behind that phrase and the threat of war included within the final paragraph of the KhubilaiKhan;inChina andKorea,hesucceeded inenlargingtheempirehe inheritedfromhisgrandfather GenghisKhan,butfailedtodo soinJapan. 6 letter will be discussed later. For now we merely note that the ambassadors’ journey took them via Korea, where a letter was presented to the Korean king requesting his help in guiding the envoys safely to a land whose ‘institutions and administration are praiseworthy’. The ambassadors, however, went no further, having been dissuaded from travelling by raging seas and the strong hint from the Koreans that a voyage to Japan might place their lives in danger from people who were ‘obdurate and tough, with no sense of propriety or order’. It was a very different perception. A few more years were to pass before an envoy from the Great Khan was able to judge for himself how far the Japanese had fallen from the level of exemplary behaviour that had previously been assumed. In 1270 Zhao Liangbi travelled to Japan carrying a message in which Japan was praised in the accepted terms of ‘a country renowned for its knowledge of etiquette’, but it took no more than 12 months of residence for Zhao’s personal observations and conclusions to reverse that official perception. ‘I have lived in Japan for a year,’ wrote the learned envoy. ‘I have observed the people’s customs and found that the Japanese are cruel and bloodthirsty. They do not recognize the bond between father and son or the etiquette pertaining to relations between superiors and inferiors.’ Part of the reason for Zhao Liangbi’s contempt for his hosts was their haughty refusal to respond to the official letter from the Great Khan offering friendly relations, but a further factor to have brought about this radical difference in perception was the reprehensible behaviour of the Japanese pirates against China’s neighbour. Korea had been chosen not only for its geographical convenience but because its ability to resist attacks from the sea was being consistently reduced by the need to combat other attacks that were being delivered overland. In view of what was to happen in 1274 it is particularly ironic to discover that these raids were in fact a series of Mongol invasions of Korea. The first Mongol incursion into Korea involved no more than the pursuit by the Mongols across the Yalu River of fleeing Khitan troops who had been refused supplies by the Koreans and gone raiding in Korea instead. In 1231 the Mongols returned as invaders in their own right, and after a series of sieges in northern Korea the royal court of the ruling Goryeo dynasty took refuge on the island of Ganghwa. For the first time in the history of the Mongol conquests the Mongols were faced with a barrier of the sea. Lacking any means whereby that could cross this tiny stretch of water – and the strait was only one kilometre wide – their immediate aim of the surrender of the Goryeo monarch was frustrated. It was a strange portent of the problems that would face the Mongol army when the fight was to be taken to Japan. After several further raids the Mongol army invaded Korea in 1254 for what was to prove the last time. Ganghwa Island still remained untaken, but in 1258 radical developments within Korean politics greatly helped the Mongol cause. Throughout all the previous invasions the resistance from Ganghwa had been controlled not by the Korean king but by a hardline, anti- Mongol faction. When its leader was assassinated in 1258 the king assumed personal control of the government and indicated his intention to negotiate a peace. Hostages were sent to the Mongol court as proof of goodwill, but in an action called the ‘Rebellion of the Three Patrols’ a group of diehard Korean military officers deposed his successor and determined to keep fighting. Mongol troops were invited in by the Korean royal family to overthrow the rebels, which they did in 1270, and the insurgents fled to Jeju 7 Island. In 1273 the Korean crown prince was married to Khubilai Khan’s daughter, and with this alliance the resistance from Jeju ceased. Half of Jeju Island was given over to a grazing ground for Mongol horses in a process of pacification that was paralleled throughout mainland Korea. At first the Mongols appeared to